Other publications by this author
- 'Securing' the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953
- The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime
- The Political Economies of Criminal Justice
- The Limits of the Limits of Idealism: Rethinking American Refugee Policy in an Insecure World
- The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Administrative Law Dilemmas
- Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic of Legal Mandates
- Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates
- Auditing Executive Discretion
- 'Securing' the Bureaucracy: The Federal Security Agency and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 1939-1953
- Brief Amici Curiae Bar Associations, Human Rights Organizations and Other Legal Groups in Support of Petitioners
Author
- Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
- Stanford Law School
- tcuellar@stanford.edu
- 650 723.9216